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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORP.,
Appellate Court No. 98-0062 CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Priority No. 15
J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION, dba JACK'S
SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR and
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR.,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Objection to Appellee's Statement of Facts:
Appellants J.W.C.J.R. Corporation et al. (hereinafter "lessees") respond and object
to Appellee Colonial Pacific's "Statement of Facts" as follows:
1.

Fact #2 is more properly termed a statement of law, not a statement of fact.

Further, Colonial Pacific's assertion that the subject lease agreement was governed by
Article 2A of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is erroneous. The express terms of the
lease agreement state that any litigation regarding the validity and enforcement of the
lease would be governed by Oregon law, with jurisdiction residing in the state of Oregon.
(Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #1, paragraph 7; see also Appellant's opening Brief at 10 n.l
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(noting that both parties elected to try this case under Utah law)).
2.

Fact #3 is a mere generalization, not a statement of fact. The same

objection applies to Fact #15.
3.

Fact #6 contains a lengthy recitation of various sections of the parties' lease

agreement. This recitation of bold-faced, upper capital letters makes this section appear
about twenty times larger than it actually does in the lease. It should be remembered that
the trial court made the following comment after examining the fine print of the lease:
"[Tjhat's the smallest print I've ever seen, but go ahead." (T.T. at 83.)
4.

Facts #13 and #14 are nothing more than redundant restatements of prior

statements of fact.
5.

Fact #16 presents a legal argument, not a factual statement. Further, there

is nothing in the Record to suggest that Cumberledge made the initial payment to
Colonial Pacific "[consistent with his acceptance of the equipment and the terms and
conditions of the lease agreement." On the contrary, this payment was made on June 9,
1993, the same day that Cumberledge signed the lease; this occurred before he had ever
received any of the leased equipment. (A copy of the subject check is reproduced in
Appellee's Brief at Addendum 2.) This issue is more folly addressed in Argument I
below.
6.

Fact #19 is disputed. There is substantial record evidence indicating that

Colonial Pacific was told about lessees' problems with the equipment well before
October 30,1995. For example, Cumberledge testified that in June of 1993, he told a
2

Colonial Pacific representative that the equipment was junk. In turn, Cumberledge was
told that if he did not receive a payment booklet, he could assume the lease had been
canceled. (T.T. at 17, 62-66.) Further, Colonial Pacific may not disregard the trial
court's own Findings of Fact, which state as follows: "5. Defendant John Cumberledge
informed Plaintiff on two occasions that the equipment was not operational. 6. The
equipment was returned to Bottomline Systems, Inc. subsequent to the signing and
execution of the finance lease. 7. The Defendants were not contacted by Plaintiff until
approximately two years thereafter\ at which time Plaintiff sought payment in M l from
Defendants." (Finding of Fact #5, 7; see also Ruling of Nov. 24, 1997, at 2-3) (emphasis
added).
7.

Fact #20 is disputed, and Colonial Pacific's citation to page 18 of the

Record to support its contention that Cumberledge "admitted he still had the equipment in
boxes" is disingenuous. Page 18 contains testimony from Colonial Pacific's litigation
specialist, not from Cumberledge. It was Cumberledge5s uncontroverted testimony that
the equipment had been boxed up and returned to the supplier, with the exception of the
keyboard, which the supplier failed to pick up. (T.T. at 62-66.) These facts were
corroborated by the testimony of Alan Shupe, a disinterested third-party, and have been
embodied in the trial court's Findings of Fact. (T.T. at 76-77; Finding of Fact #6; see
also Ruling of November 24, 1997, at 3.)
8.

Fact #21 is argumentative, and is not borne out by the Record. Colonial

Pacific's own witness at trial testified that lessees' account had fallen into a "black hole."
3

(Cite.) It would be very difficult to record a conversation about an account that had
fallen into a black hole. Further, Colonial Pacific would have this Court overlook the
following exchange that occurred during closing argument:
[Attorney for Colonial Pacific:] Now that phone call, Your Honor,
contrary to counsel's statement, is disputed. My client says that had
that have happened, it would have been in the log.
THE COURT: How could it be if it went down a black hole for two
years?
(Trial Transcripts at 104-105.)

Objection to Appellee's Repeated References to
the Trial Court by Name;
Lessees also respectfully object to Colonial Pacific's repeated pattern of referring
to the trial judge by name. Such a practice is nondeferential, and is inappropriate for
purposes of appeal.

ARGUMENT
I.

COLONIAL PACIFIC'S ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE
ACCEPTANCE FROM THE RECORD IS WOEFULLY
LACKING IN EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT

Recognizing that the concept of "acceptance" is the pivotal issue before this Court
on appeal, Colonial Pacific claims there is "abundant[J undisputed evidence in the
Record supporting a finding of acceptance." Appellee Brief at 19. However, when
4

Colonial Pacific attempts to marshal the evidence in support of such a finding, it can
muster a total of only five items of evidence to support its position. Despite Colonial
Pacific's assertions to the contrary, this evidence is neither "abundant" nor "undisputed,"
and also fails to meet the statutory requirements of an acceptance.
The first item of evidence advanced by Colonial Pacific in favor of a finding of
acceptance is the demonstration performed by Bottomline for the lessees. See Appellee's
Brief at 19. Colonial Pacific claims that since lessees had been provided with a
demonstration showing how similar equipment would operate, they knew the "type of
equipment [they] were getting before [they] ever signed a lease agreement." Id. Colonial
Pacific fails to show how this fact equates to an "acceptance" of the leased goods. It is
quite obvious, however, that the demonstration by itself cannot support a finding of
acceptance. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515, a party to a lease agreement does
not accept the leased goods until at least three conditions are met, namely: (1) lessees
have received delivery of the leased goods; (2) lessees have been afforded a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods', and finally, (3) lessees signify that the goods are
conforming, or that they will take them in spite of their nonconformity. Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2a-515(l)(a) (emphasis added). In the alternative, an acceptance may also occur if
a lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods after the goods are delivered.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515(l)(b) (citing § 70A-2a-509(2)).
When analyzed in the context of these statutory requirements, it is clear that the
demonstration performed by Bottomline lends no support for a finding of acceptance. By
5

Colonial Pacific's own admission (see Appellee Brief at 19), the subject demonstration
occurred before the lease agreement was even signed by lessees and before the lessees
had received any of the equipment. Because acceptance cannot occur until after lessees
have received the goods and they have been provided with a reasonable opportunity to
inspect them, the demonstration by itself cannot support a finding of acceptance.
Colonial Pacific's reliance on the same is therefore unhelpful.
The next item of evidence cited by Colonial Pacific to support a finding of
acceptance is the delivery of the equipment to lessees. See Appellee Brief at 19. This
item of evidence comes closer to providing some support for an acceptance, but still fails
to pass muster. The mere fact that lessees have received possession of the equipment
does not amount to an acceptance, because lessees still must be given a reasonable
opportunity to make an inspection. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515(l). In the instant
case, the Record indicates that on the same day the equipment was delivered, lessees
informed Colonial Pacific that the equipment was not functioning properly. (T.T. at 12,
58-60; Finding of Fact #4.) Accordingly, no acceptance could have occurred on that day.
Colonial Pacific must therefore look to other evidence beyond mere delivery of the
equipment to support a finding of acceptance.
Colonial Pacific next turns to the initial payment of $515.76 made by
Cumberledge under the lease agreement, and argues that such payment constituted an act
"consistent with acceptance." Appellee Brief at 19. Colonial Pacific concedes, however,
that this payment was made in advance of the actual delivery of the equipment to the
6

lessees. Again, pursuant to section -515, acceptance cannot occur until after lessees have
received the goods and after they have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them. It is undisputed that Cumberledge's initial payment was made on June 9, 1993, one
day before he received the equipment. Consequently, this item of evidence also fails to
lend any support for a finding of acceptance.
The fourth item of evidence relied upon by Colonial Pacific for a finding of
acceptance is the written "Acknowledgement and Acceptance of Equipment by Lessee"
(hereinafter the "Acknowledgement"). Appellee Brief at 19. This Acknowledgement
was signed by Cumberledge on June 9, 1993, the same day he made the initial lease
payment and the same day he signed the lease agreement. Again, this occurred before he
had actually received any of the leased goods. Consequently, the statements contained in
the Acknowledgement are false on their face. Inasmuch as the Acknowledgement was
signed before lessees had actually received the equipment, the Acknowledgement cannot
be used to support a finding of acceptance.
The last item of evidence offered by Colonial Pacific to support a finding of
acceptance is the verbal verification made by Cumberledge on June 11, 1993, two days
after signing the lease. Because this verification occurred after lessees had received the
equipment, this is the only item of evidence introduced at trial that comes any where
close to supporting a finding of acceptance. However, as articulated in Appellant's
opening Brief, the verification still fails to satisfy the statutory requirements of an
acceptance, because it occurred before lessees had been provided with a reasonable
7

opportunity to make an inspection. Again, the verbal verification occurred only two days
after the lease was signed, and only one day after the equipment had been delivered.
Cumberledge is not sophisticated in computer programming. He is a body and fender
man. He clearly needed more time than a mere two days to inspect the equipment,
especially since he had told Colonial Pacific only one day earlier that he was having
problems getting it to operate. Sure enough, the equipment crashed the following day,
and despite his best efforts, Cumberledge was never able to get it to operate.
Appellees submit that a total of two days to inspect highly unfamiliar, complicated
computer software and hardware by a body and fender man is unreasonable, particularly
when lessees were led to believe they had thirty days within which to test the equipment.
Given the serious and irrevocable consequences of making an acceptance, as well as the
sophisticated nature of the equipment, a longer period of time to inspect was warranted.
This Court should conclude that a mere two days to inspect did not satisfy the statutory
requirements necessary to support a finding of acceptance.
The foregoing analysis shows that Colonial Pacific's so-called "abundant" and
"undisputed" evidence of acceptance actually consists of only five items of evidence that
wither in the face of the statutory definitional requirements necessary for a finding of
acceptance. Four out of the five items of evidence cited by Colonial Pacific can be
discarded outright, because those items of evidence point to events that occurred either
before delivery of the equipment was made, or at the same time of the delivery. Since a
finding of acceptance requires not only delivery but a reasonable opportunity to inspect,
8

these items of evidence can provide no support at all for Colonial Pacific's position. The
last item of evidence advanced by Colonial Pacific can also be discarded, because it
points to an event that occurred before lessees were provided with a reasonable
opportunity to inspect. Therefore, because the statutory requirements of an acceptance
were not proven at trial, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision.

H.

COLONIAL PACIFIC CANNOT TAKE REFUGE IN THE
CONCEPT OF RATIFICATION

Colonial Pacific cites to this Court's opinion in Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat
892 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), for the proposition that Cumberledge's verbal
verification "effectively ratified his prior written Acceptance of the equipment."
Appellee Brief at 20-21. Colonial Pacific's reliance on Horrocks is unavailing. In fact, a
closer inspection of the Court's holding in Horrocks actually proves fatal to Colonial
Pacific's position.
In Horrocks. a dairy farmer entered a contract for the purchase of certain dairy
equipment. Prior to the actual delivery of the equipment, a representative of the seller
had the farmer sign a written "Purchaser's Acknowledgment & Delivery Acceptance
Receipt" (the Acknowledgment), which stated that the farmer had received all of the
equipment ordered. Id. At the time he signed the Acknowledgment, the farmer knew that
the entirety of the equipment had not been delivered. The representative subsequently
made off with the undelivered equipment. Thereafter, the seller sued the farmer, seeking
9

to irrevocably commit him to making payments under the contract pursuant to the terms
of the Acknowledgment. The trial court rejected the seller's position and allowed the
farmer to escape the effect of the written Acknowledgment.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the seller
and not the farmer should bear the responsibility for the unauthorized, adverse acts of its
agent. Id. As in Horrocks. this Court should allow the lessees in the instant case to
escape the effect of their written Acknowledgement. This conclusion is compelled for
several reasons. First, like the farmer in Horrocks. Cumberledge signed the written
Acknowledgment in advance of actually receiving the leased equipment. It has already
been demonstrated that acceptance cannot occur until after delivery has been made. See
supra at

. Second, again like the farmer in Horrocks. Cumberledge has not

received a benefit from the use of the equipment. Cumberledge had the full use of the
equipment for a grand total of one day. The following day, the equipment failed, and
Cumberledge was unsuccessful in ever getting it to work again. During the next three
weeks, neither Colonial Pacific nor the supplier made any effort to assist Cumberledge in
getting the equipment to operate, despite several pleas from Cumberledge for help. Thus,
like the farmer in Horrocks. Cumberledge has been sued for equipment that, in effect, he
never had. Even more compelling is the fact that Colonial Pacific sat around for two
years before taking any action whatsoever, all the while giving Cumberledge the
impression the lease had been canceled. Colonial Pacific's reliance on Horrocks and the
concept of ratification is spurious at best. If anything, Colonial Pacific's willful pattern
10

of silence and inaction for two years compels the conclusion that the company ratified its
agent's statement to Cumberledge that the lease would be canceled if Cumberledge did
not receive a payment booklet (which he never did).

III.

THE SERIOUS DEFICIENCY IN THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CANNOT BE SAVED BY
THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD OF REVIEW

Colonial Pacific, seeking to bolster the inadequate evidence introduced at trial in
support of a finding of acceptance, relies upon an aside made by the trial court about the
existence of other facts in the Record supporting the court's decision. Appellee Brief at
21. Colonial Pacific fails to identify any such additional facts, however, and a search of
the Record fails to reveal any. While the trial court did indeed make the statement, "I'm
sure there are other facts that support... these findings and the following conclusions of
law," this statement must be considered in its proper context. Only one page earlier in
the court's Ruling does the following comment appear: "This is a case that I'd like to
make some social commentary on, but I'm going to bite my tongue and not say anything."
(Ruling at 2, a copy of which appears in Appendix B of Appellee's Brief.) Such a
comment indicates that the trial court was unhappy with the result reached in the case, but
that the court nevertheless felt compelled by the apparent irrevocability of the lease to
render a decision the way it did.
It should be remembered that lessees are not challenging the trial court's Findings
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of Fact. Instead, lessees are challenging the leap made by the trial court in arriving at its
Conclusions of Law based upon those Findings. It is clear that the trial court's legal
conclusions do not follow from the court's Findings of Fact. The trial court's Findings
overwhelmingly demonstrate a lack of acceptance and a timely rejection of the leased
goods by the lessees, not an acceptance. For example, Finding of Fact #4 states that the
equipment was delivered to lessees' place of business, "but it did not function properly."
In addition, Finding of Fact #5 states that Cumberledge informed Colonial Pacific on at
least two occasions that the equipment was not operational. Finally, Findings of Fact #6
and #7 state that lessees subsequently returned the equipment to the supplier, and had no
other contact with Colonial Pacific for two years thereafter. These written Findings of
Fact are consistent with the verbal findings communicated by the trial court on November
24, 1997, and overwhelmingly demonstrate a lack of acceptance by lessees.
The trial court's Conclusions of Law simply cannot be squared with these Findings
of Fact. Despite reaching these Findings, the court nevertheless upheld the irrevocability
of the lease, requiring lessees to forever make payments to Colonial Pacific. A party's
promise to make payments under a lease agreement becomes irreovocable only after that
party has accepted the goods. The trial court's Conclusions of Law show a fundamental
misunderstanding of this principle, and the court's decision upholding the irrevocability
of the lease is erroneous as a matter of law. Such a fundamental misapplication of the
law is not a mere "technical deficiency" that would be saved by the harmless error
standard of review, as Colonial Pacific has claimed. See Appellee Brief at 21. Instead,
12

this is a serious deficiency that mandates reversal of the trial court's decision.

IV,

LESSEES TIMELY REJECTED THE LEASED EQUIPMENT

Colonial Pacific argues at page 23 of its Appellee Brief that "Cumberledge cannot
reject equipment he has already accepted." It is well recognized that "acceptance" and
"rejection" are mutually exclusive terms. A party cannot both accept and reject leased
goods, but must do one or the other. Thus, this case boils down to whether Cumberledge
accepted the leased equipment, or whether he timely rejected the same after having been
afforded a reasonable opportunity to make an inspection.
Colonial Pacific argues that lessee's reliance on the doctrine of rejection as
embodied in section 70A-2a-509 is "grossly misplaced," contending that section -509
does not apply to finance lease agreements. Appellee Brief at 23. It is lessees' position,
however, that section -509 is made applicable to finance lease agreements through the
express language of section 70A-2a-515, which Colonial Pacific cites as a determinative
authority in this appeal. Appellee Brief at 2. Section 70A-2a-515 defines what actions
may constitute an acceptance, and states that an acceptance of goods may occur when a
"lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods as provided in Subsection 70A2a-509(2)." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515(b) (1997). Accordingly, pursuant to the
express language of this provision, it appears that section -509 does have some
application to finance lease agreements. And even if section -509 applied only to
installment lease agreements, that section would still be helpful in analyzing the concept
13

of rejection.
The key elements of a rightful rejection are two, namely: (1) that a lessee rejects
nonconforming or defective goods within a reasonable time after delivery of the same;
and, (2) that the lessee seasonably notifies the lessor of that rejection. In the instant case,
the trial court's Findings of Fact clearly evidence a timely rejection by Cumberledge of
the leased equipment. Cumberledge had the equipment for no more than three weeks,
during which time he boxed it up and returned it to the supplier after he was unable to get
it to operate properly. The trial court's bench ruling of November 24, 1997, bears this
out. During the course of making this ruling, the court stated: "The computer equipment
was set up by Mr. Cumberledge [and he] was not able to get it to function properly. He
had Bottom Line pick up the computer equipment at some later date.... Mr.
Cumberledge contacted Colonial Pacific Leasing and advised them of the problem. Two
to three weeks later, he contacted Colonial again and advised them of the problem. He
was under the impression that if he didn't hear from Colonial, everything was okay
regarding the lease." (Ruling of Nov. 24, 1997, at 3 (Appellee Brief at Addendum B).
Such findings leave no doubt that Cumberledge timely rejected the leased
equipment as defective, and seasonably notified Colonial Pacific of that rejection.
Cumberledge's rejection occurred within three weeks after delivery of the equipment to
him. A three week period to inspect and reject the equipment should be considered
reasonable, given the relative complexity of the equipment, Cumberledge's lack of
expertise, and the representation made to Cumberledge that he would have thirty days
14

within which to test the equipment to ensure it was operational. In short, there is
abundant Record evidence showing that Cumberledge made a timely rejection of the
leased goods, and such evidence finds recognition in the trial court's Findings of Fact. In
light of those Findings, the court clearly erred in failing to conclude that lessees timely
rejected the leased equipment, thus discharging their obligation to make payments under
the lease.

V.

COLONIAL PACIFIC IS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFIT FROM
A STRICT RULE OF ACCEPTANCE

Colonial Pacific's Brief at section E argues that sound public policy favors strict
observance of the rule of acceptance. Colonial Pacific fails to delineate, however, why it
should benefit from such a rule, or what exactly such a rule would entail. Nevertheless, it
appears from the tone of its Brief that Colonial Pacific favors a very short period within
which to make an inspection under a finance lease, perhaps as short as one day.1 In
effect, Colonial Pacific is asking this Court to compel lessees to pay more than
$20,000.00 for defective equipment that was operational for a total of one day, and which
was in the lessees' possession for a total of three weeks. Such a position is untenable,
and could hardly have been what the legislature had in mind when it enacted special

Colonial Pacific contacted lessees on the very day the equipment was delivered, asking if
the equipment was operational. Had the equipment functioned properly, lessees would have had
less than one day to inspect the equipment, and Colonial Pacific would now be arguing that that
period of time constituted a reasonable opportunity to inspect.
15

protections for finance lessors. In any event, Colonial Pacific's actions in this case do not
entitle the company to benefit from a strict rule of acceptance.
Despite assertions from it to the contrary, Colonial Pacific actively encouraged
lessees to lie by having them sign a false Acknowledgement. (T.T. at 14-15, 44-48).
Colonial Pacific should not benefit from encouraging such a dubious and dishonest
practice. Nor should the company benefit from its refusal to respond to lessees'
numerous and repeated requests for assistance in getting the equipment to operate. In
addition, Colonial Pacific should not benefit from affirmatively representing to lessees
that if they did not receive a monthly invoice, they could assume the lease had been
canceled. (T.T. at 65-66.) Colonial Pacific never once sent any invoices to lessees, even
though its own documents represented that lessees would be invoiced monthly.2 Finally,
Colonial Pacific should not benefit from its own willful inaction and silence for two
years, nor from its own negligence in somehow allowing lessees' account to fall into a
black hole. With a straight face, the company asked for and received from the trial court,
interest for this dead time. Under the circumstances of this case, it would be a gross
injustice to allow Colonial Pacific to collect any more payments from lessees under the
lease.

2

Colonial Pacific offered into evidence a lease processing sheet that was obviously a
questionnaire checklist. Colonial Pacific now wants to use the verification part of the checklist to
its advantage, while disregarding the statement that lessees would be "invoiced monthly."
16

VL

REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE IS A RED-HERRING

Colonial Pacific argues in section F of its Brief that lessees may not rely on the
doctrine of revocation of acceptance, since that doctrine has a very limited application
and because lessees have not raised that issue before the trial court. Appellee Brief at 27.
However, nowhere in lessee's opening Brief is that doctrine ever mentioned as a basis for
overturning the trial court's decision, nor, for that matter, is the doctrine ever mentioned
in lessee's Brief at all. Accordingly, the doctrine of revocation of acceptance is a redherring. It should be noted, however, that lessees did raise that issue before the trial court
in their Trial Brief, and Colonial Pacific responded to that issue during closing argument.
T.T. at 91-92. Consequently, it is an incorrect statement by Colonial Pacific to assert that
the issue was never addressed below.

VII.

LESSEES' REASONABLY RELIED UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT THEY HAD A THIRTY DAY TRIAL PERIOD
WITHIN WHICH TO TEST THE LEASED EQUIPMENT

Section G of Colonial Pacific's Brief argues that any reliance by lessees on the
representation that they had thirty days to test the leased equipment would not be
reasonable, because the written contract contains no such provision. Appellee Brief at
29. Colonial Pacific's argument is ill-asserted. It was entirely reasonable for lessees to
rely on that representation, particularly since it was reinforced by the company's own two
year period of silence and its own statement to lessees that they could assume the lease
had been taken care of if they did not receive a billing statement. Cumberledge never
17

once received a billing statement from Colonial Pacific, nor did he have any other contact
with the company for two years. In light of these facts, which find recognition in the trial
court's Findings, it would have been entirely unreasonable for lessees to not rely on the
representation that they had thirty days to test the equipment. Similarly, it would have
been entirely unreasonable for lessees to not rely on the representation made by Colonial
Pacific that the lease had been timely canceled.
Regardless of whether the lease agreement expressly allowed for a thirty day trial
period, such a period of time should be implied by this Court as the operable time for
making an inspection. In light of the severe consequences of making an acceptance, a
thirty day inspection period would have provided a workable middle ground affording
both parties with protection. On the one hand, it would have allowed lessees a reasonable
opportunity for an inspection, without rushing them into accepting defective equipment.
At the same time, a thirty day inspection period would still have provided Colonial
Pacific with the statutory protections typically afforded to finance lessors, and would
have allowed that company to have avoided funding a lease that was problematic from the
outset.3 Having rushed Cumberledge into making a verbal verification only one day after
he received the equipment, Colonial Pacific now asks this Court for its stamp of approval.
Colonial Pacific has sought to deny lessees of their statutory right to make a reasonable

incidentally, the only evidence introduced at trial showing that Colonial Pacific funded the
lease was the self-serving testimonyfromits litigation specialist. No documentary evidence was
offered to show that any money was paid to the supplier, nor to show when such money was paid.
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inspection. This Court should uphold that right, and should reverse the trial court's
decision.

CONCLUSION/MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES
Lessees in good faith entered a finance lease agreement for the lease of certain
computer equipment and software. Although they have had the use of the equipment for
only one day, they have been hauled into court by an absentee lessor that has sat on its
rights and affirmatively represented that the lease had been canceled. The trial court
erroneously concluded the lease was irrevocable, and entered judgment against lessees in
excess of $21,275.30.00. The trial court's own Findings of Fact recognize, however, that
the equipment was defective, and was promptly returned to the supplier within three
weeks of delivery. Based upon the court's own findings, it is clear that lessees never
accepted the leased goods, and in fact timely rejected the same. Hence lessees were
discharged from their responsibility of making payments under the lease. The trial
court's decision is therefore erroneous as a matter of law, and clearly cannot be sustained
on appeal. Lessees respectfully ask this Court to overturn that decision, and to dismiss
this matter with prejudice. Lessees further move this Court for an award of all costs and
fees incurred in having to prosecute this appeal, pursuant to the terms of the parties' lease
agreement, and to remand to the trial court for a determination of defendant's costs of
trial.
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Attorney for Appellants
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